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We investigate the systemically important banks in the Indonesian financial system using
Multivariate GARCH Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR). The systemic risk measurement, ΔCoVaR,
defined as the change from CoVaR in its benchmark state as a one-standard-deviation event to its
CoVaR under financial distress. We estimate the systemic risk contribution using 21 commercial
banks from January 2007 to December 2018. Our study reveals that the top five ranking systemic
banks are dominated by state-owned banks, and its ranking is consistently the same in the period
before, during, and after the global financial crisis. Finally, we empirically find that systemic risk
in Indonesia is strongly affected by external factors rather than bank characteristics. Based on this
finding, we suggest that the government should maintain the regulation of external effect rather than
the domestic effect.
Keywords: Systemic Risk, GARCH, Spillover, Crisis, Banks
JEL Classification: G12, G17, G21, G28, G32

Introduction
Systemically important banks are the main
concern of the central bank in order to maintain
overall stability in the financial system. These
banks have been identified to have a systemic
risk as the failure of these banks would have
a significant costs to the financial system and
the economy as a whole. Systemic risk has its
moment when the recent financial turmoil hit
the world starting in the summer of 2007 could
infect the entire US financial and global banking system. While the banking system became
generally affected by the crisis, bank wealth
differed substantially in terms of market valuations and on the scale of government intervention received.

The global financial crisis shows us that the
accumulation of deteriorating global economic
and financial conditions that undermined the
bank system in both developed and emerging
markets has alerted the public to the fragility
of the financial system and the importance of
systemic risk. Hence, it is very fundamental
to understand the nature and the measurement
of systemic risk to keep financial stability. Research from Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, & Alentorn, (2008) argued that the nature of systemic
risk arises through four primary mechanism:
1) direct bilateral exposures between banks; 2)
correlated exposure of banks due to conventional source of risk; 3) feedback effect from
fire sales assets by distressed institutions; 4)
Contagion and spillover.

* Corresponding author’s email: usman.arief@ugm.ac.id
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Understanding the nature of systemic risk
can serve as a benefit to the government and
scholars. The structure of a banking sector and
network among banks determine the degree of
concentrated systems as prone to systemic risk.
Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012) provide a survey of 31 quantitative systemic risk
measurement in the economic and finance literature. These measurements indicate that 31
definitions of systemic risk do not converge.
However, the various definitions refer to one
keyword as mentioned by Bandt and Hartmann
(2000) which defines systemic risk as a risk of
financial instability which widespread and impairs the functioning of the financial system to
the point where economic growth and welfare
would suffer significantly.
The definitions of systemic risk as we mentioned above regarding the widespread risk or
spillover from the failure of the system to financial institutions or vice versa serve as a motivation for this study to measure the systemic risk
using spillover mechanism (see (Acharya, Pedersen, & Richardson, 2016). However, recent
studies from Adrian & Brunnermeier (2016)
introduce systemic risk measurement from a
spillover point of view: Conditional Value-atRisk (CoVaR). They define CoVaRi,j as the VaR
of institution i conditional on institution j being
in financial distress. By conditioning on another
institution’s financial distress, Girardi & Ergün
(2013) aim to go beyond idiosyncratic risk and
to capture the possible risk spillovers among
financial institutions, combining the idea of a
multivariate GARCH approach and CoVaR.
They modify the definition of CoVaR proposed
by earlier that the distress event condition on
institution j is at most at its VaR, as opposed to
being exactly at its VaR. The results from multivariate GARCH CoVaR has proven to be more
precise than the original CoVaR. Finally, we
define the systemic risk as to the shortfall contribution of financial institution i to the financial
system, ΔCoVaR.
We investigate the systemic risk in emerging
countries, particularly in Indonesia. This country has a unique characteristic compared to other countries in Southeast Asian since the country heavily depends on the banking system. The
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proportion of the total fund from Indonesia’s
banking system to GPD was 42 % in 2017 and
is projected to reach 60% in 2020. The study
from Law & Singh (2014) reveals that too much
dependency on the banking sector will have a
potential malfunction in the financial system in
which directly harm economic growth. Secondly, we examine the time-series relation between
ΔCoVaR and institution characteristics such as;
value at risk each institution, size, and beta (see
(Lorenc, Zhang, & Zhang, 2020), and (Anna &
Veraart, 2020). Given the issue of “too big too
fail” and various proposals regarding the policy-makers scrutiny that institutions bearing the
idiosyncratic factors to drive the systemic risk.
The relation between the size, value at risk,
and beta is crucial to understand the most significant factors to determine the systemic risk
in Indonesian banking system. Furthermore, we
control the regression model using specific factors such as time dummy before and during the
crisis, the United States stock index, S&P 500
stock index, and international interbank interest
rates, SIBOR 1 month. Hence, this study will
look to answer these following questions:
1. How the systemically important banks in Indonesia using CoVaR measurement?
2. What factors determine the systemic risk in
Indonesian banking system?
The contribution of this study for financial
stability is threefold. Firstly, we provide the estimation of systemic risk that is more sensitive
to the changes in regime-switching period and
sufficiently reliable for day-to-day use. Secondly, our study can be considered as the early
warnings signal to assess systemic events since
CoVaR can be estimated using a high-frequency
basis and can be updated anytime. Lastly, this
study can improve the supervisory approach to
monitor the highest systemically bank that potentially harm the financial system in Indonesia.
According to the empirical results, we find
that the VaR of each institution has a positive
and significant effect on systemic risk at the
99% level. Also, our results suggest that systemic risk in Indonesia can be positively and
significantly explained at the 99% level by the
external factors included in the study, namely
the United States stock index (S&P 500), and
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SIBOR 1-month. This finding implies the driver
of systemic risk in Indonesia comes from both
the internal as well as the external factors. Our
results are consistent with the findings from Reboredo & Ugolini (2015) who argued that the
determinants of systemic risk are common and
specific factors from both external and internal
countries. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formally defines
CoVaR and presents the estimation procedure.
Section 3 describes the methodology and data.
Section 4 provides the findings. Section 5 concludes the study.

Literature Review
The Concept of Systemic Event
To understand the definition of systemic risk
in a financial system, first of all, we need to understand the concept of a systemic event. Bandt
and Harmant (2000) described a systemic event
into two perspectives. First of all, the narrow
sense where the emergence of “bad news” in
a financial institution that causes sequential
effects on one or several financial institutions
causing the failure of the financial system. In
this case, although the financial system is fundamentally solvent, the idiosyncratic shock
from one institution has a contagion effect on
other institutions so that the failure will spread
and affects the financial system as a whole. Second, the broad sense concept of systemic events
is the failure of large numbers of institutions or
markets at the same time due to the severe and
widespread effect of systematic shocks.
Based on these two terms (narrow and broad
sense), then systemic risk can be defined into
two key elements: namely shocks and widespread mechanism. The first key element is the
shock which can be idiosyncratic or systematic.
Following the financial theory, idiosyncratic
shock initially only affects one particular financial institution. For example, the failure of
a single regional bank due to internal fraud can
affect a national financial system in the whole
country. Secondly, a systematic shock is the
type of shock that can affect the whole financial system or economy such as a stock market

crash can be a systematic shock on most financial institutions despite the different exposure
for each financial institution.
The second key element of systemic risk is
the spillover mechanism from one institution to
another, and ultimately it affects the financial
system. The spread of the shock in the financial system can be channelled through physical
exposure or the information effects (including
potential losses). Based on this perspective, we
should evaluate further on the various widespread mechanisms of the network in banking
and financial markets. From the concept of
adjustment equilibrium, the process of “shock
transmission” does not always serve as an adverse event as it makes the condition of the financial system returns to the equilibrium point,
called as the self-establishing adjustment. However, in systemic conditions, the risk of shock
transmission is destabilizing and leads to a default of crashes between real and financial variables. For example, the global financial crisis
(GFC) in 2008 may trigger a wave of failures
of banks, and this can deeply harm the financial
system as a whole in the United States.
The arrival of internal shocks within countries and the subsequent propagation is uncertain. For example, the strong systemic events
such as a crisis have low probability events,
which might lead as an insignificant concern
to the the government. However, this might be
a significant problem when the financial structures are strongly interconnected globally. The
severe systemic events from other countries
will have a destabilizing effect to the internal financial system. Therefore, this argument undermines the reason why the government should
consider both internal and external factors.
Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) Adrian
and Brunnermeier
According to Adrian & Brunnermeier
(2016), CoVaRi is defined by the VaR of the
whole financial sector conditional on institution i being in a particular state. The systemic
risk measure is ΔCoVaR in which the difference
between CoVaR conditional on the distress of
an institution and the CoVaR conditional on the
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median state of the institution. ΔCoVaR is a statistical tail-dependency measure, and measure
the contribution of a financial institution to the
whole financial system when the condition at
its VaR.
Suppose that the return from the institution
ri and the significance level is q, VaRiq,t is defined as the q-quantile of the return distribution
in equation (1). (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016)
or AB proposed that CoVaR is implicitly defined by the q-quantile of the conditional distribution (see equation 2) where VaRj is the value
at risk of financial system, j.
(1)
Pr (Rit ≤ CoVaRi q,t = VaRj q,t) = q

(2)

In order to make a time-varying estimation
of VaRj and CoVaRi, AB runs a q-quantile regression of Rj on a set of (lagged) state variables. Once the regression has run, they obtain
VaRj = α + βMt and the estimation of CoVaRi
will be:
CoVaRi = c + dVaRj + eMt-1

(3)

Where M is a vector of state variables, and
the risk contribution from a financial institution to the financial system at median state or
ΔCoVaRi = CoVaRi – CoVaRi50,t. The equation
(3) describes that CoVaRi is the product function
of state variable M. The correlation between financial system j and individual financial institution i is time-varying, the parameter of quantile regression is the same. Hence, the potential
problem will arise when estimating CoVaR for
a long horizon since the dynamic relationship
between an individual and state variables will
not be captured. To solve the problem, (Girardi
& Ergün, 2013) proposed the CoVaR estimation using the Multivariate GARCH model to
capture the dynamic relation overtime.

Research Methodology

tion process and prior to the process, the author
did preliminary measures such as stationarity
test. We use the three stages of estimation from
Girardi & Ergün (2013). The first step is estimating the marginal model for each institution
i. Following Reboredo & Ugolini (2015), the
marginal model of financial institutions is the
function between the conditional mean of individual bank returns and the common as well
as the specific factors. Where the common factors, X1t, include interbank interest rates, interbank loan rates, and dummy variable crisis. The
specific factors,X1t, are the stock market index
return (Rm, t) and volatility index, VIX. Volatility Index is a real-time market index that represents the 30-day forward-looking volatility.
The index is derived from the price inputs of
the S&P index options. This study uses the VIX
because it provides a measure of market risk
and investors’ sentiment. Typically, research
analysts and portfolio managers look to VIX as
the benchmark before deciding to invest or not.
Thus, combining with those factors, the marginal model for individual banks is specified as:
(4)
To seize the asymmetric volatility, we estimate equation (4) using GJR-GARCH (1,1)
from Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993).
Where σ2it is the conditional variance for institution i, and It, a dummy variable.

(5)
The second step, we estimate the multivariate process using Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) from (Engle, 2012). Let there a
two returns Rj is the return of value weighted financial institutions and Ri whose joint dynamics equation (Rj= Rsys, Ri);
Rt=μt+εt

Multivariate GARCH CoVaR Estimation
In this section, we will describe the Multivariate GARCH (M-GARCH) CoVaR estima122
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Where Σt is the metrics conditional covariance of the disturbance term εt and μt is the
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(2x1) vector conditional means. {Dxx}t = {Σxx}
t, {Dx,y}t = 0 for x, y =s, j is the diagonal matrix
with the conditional variances which are modeled as GJR - GARCH (1,1).

Hence, the conditional covariance σxy,t is
(6)
Let Ct=Dt-1/2∑tDt-1/2={ρxy}t be the (2x2) matrix
of conditional correlations of εt, then the conditional correlation matrix as follows:
Ct = diag (Qt) – 1/2 x Qt x diag (Qt) – 1/2
Qt = (1–δ1–δ2) Q + δ1 (ut–u’t-1) + δ2 Qt-1

(7)

The final step we combine step 1 and step 2
to obtain CoVaR for individu institution i for
time period t. Given the definition of CoVaRi,t
follows:

We back to the definiton of VaRi, Pr (Ri ≤
VaRi)=q, so Pr ( ≤ CoVaRi, Ri ≤ VaRi) = q2
When we let x,y = s, h given the VaRi for
estimation in step 1, we can solve the following
double integral for CoVaR
(8)
The calculation of CoVaRi follows the three
step procedure above,but we use benchmark
state instead of being less than its VaRi which is
μt – σt ≤ rt ≤ μt + σt . Once we retrieve the marginal probability Pr (μt – σt ≤ rt ≤ μt + σt ) = pt for
each institution j, CoVaRi is defined by the following joint probability Pr(Rit ≤ CoVaRi, μt – σt
≤ rt ≤ μt + σt )= pitq. The calculation of CoVaRi
is similar from solving the double integral.
(9)
We solve the problem of double integral by
combining the simple expression for VaR if

losses are distributed, we can solve the problem
of CoVaRi as follow:
CoVaRi = θ-1(q%) (1-( )2)1/2
		
+θ-1(q%)

(10)

because θ-1(50%)=0, and under Gaussian Framework we also solve the problem of ΔCoVaR
which is pinned down by three determinants
measurement; the correlation, the volatility of
financial system, and the Gaussian quantile.
ΔCoVaRi = θ-1(q%) ρi

(11)

The Data
In this study, we employ monthly stock
transaction data from Thomson Reuters database and datastream. Our sample period is from
January 2007 to December 2018. We use this
sample window as the main goal of the study
is to investigate the financial heating in Indonesia during and recovery period from the global
financial crisis in 2008. Wang (2014) argues
that the financial turbulence in the US started in
2007 during the summer session (August 2007)
and ended on April 2, 2009 when the G20 summit was held in London and the global economy
was on the turn from this point. The range of
periods are very useful to identify systemic risk
and which institutions were in the worst condition during this period in Indonesia. According
to this time window, we find 21 banks that are
consistently listed during the period.

Results and Discussions
In this section, we will provide the findings from our estimation results. Table 2 provides the summary statistics for ΔCoVaR99,t for
each institution from 2005 to 2018. Recall that
ΔCoVaR measures the change in the value at
risk of the financial system associated with
stress at institution i. We report the mean, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation for the 21 commercial banks in Indonesia.
The highest mean of ΔCoVaR estimation is
from Bank Mandiri and Bank BCA (BBCA) at
15.55% and 14.34% respectively. This finding
123
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Table 1. Sample Banks
Code
AGRO
BABP
BBCA
BBNI
BBNP
BBRI
BCIC
BDMN
BEKS
BKSW
BMRI
BNGA
BNII
BNLI
BSWD
BVIC
INPC
MAYA
MEGA
NISP
PNBN

Name of bank
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Agroniaga Tbk
PT Bank MNC Internasional Tbk.
Bank Central Asia Tbk
Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk
Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Tbk
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk
PT Bank JTrust Indonesia Tbk.
Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk
PT Bank Pembangunan Daerah Banten Tbk.
PT Bank QNB Indonesia Tbk
Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk
PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk
PT Bank Maybank Indonesia Tbk
Bank Permata Tbk
Bank of India Indonesia Tbk
Bank Victoria International Tbk
Bank Artha Graha Internasional Tbk
Bank Mayapada Internasional Tbk
Bank Mega Tbk
PT Bank OCBC NISP Tbk
Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk

Date of IPO
08/08/2003
15/07/2002
31/05/2000
25/11/1996
10/01/2001
10/11/2003
25/06/1997
06/12/1989
13/07/2001
21/11/2002
14/07/2003
29/11/1989
21/11/1989
15/01/1990
01/05/2002
30/06/1999
29/08/1990
29/08/1997
17/04/2000
20/10/1994
29/12/1982

Notes: We exclude banks which are not listed from January 2007 to December 2018

Table 2. Full Sample Estimation of ΔCoVaR99,t
Mean

Median

Maximum

Minimum

Std. Dev.

Briagro

5.56%

4.73%

Mnc

4.05%

3.46%

26.58%

1.57%

3.43%

16.15%

2.53%

Bbca

14.34%

1.94%

12.26%

57.65%

8.80%

6.81%

Bbni
Bbnp

13.88%

11.72%

62.30%

8.25%

7.09%

-0.08%

-0.07%

-0.04%

-0.33%

0.05%

Bbri

15.34%

12.97%

65.65%

9.35%

7.64%

Bcic

8.64%

8.22%

31.18%

2.86%

3.67%

Bdmn

12.81%

10.76%

57.85%

7.15%

6.82%

Beks

3.27%

2.40%

30.70%

-2.58%

3.23%

Bksw

4.88%

3.98%

35.26%

-4.72%

4.17%

Mandiri

15.55%

13.38%

67.45%

8.05%

7.95%

Bnga

11.90%

10.00%

60.29%

4.78%

6.69%

Bnii

9.01%

7.69%

35.94%

5.62%

4.31%

Bnli

9.78%

8.08%

58.70%

3.94%

6.01%

Bswd

3.45%

2.97%

12.44%

1.98%

1.56%

Bvic

7.34%

6.32%

40.78%

2.55%

4.13%

Inpc

6.99%

6.31%

29.98%

0.85%

3.89%

Maya

3.12%

2.52%

18.36%

1.08%

2.01%

Mega

3.48%

2.97%

14.13%

1.20%

1.82%

Nisp

6.65%

5.70%

30.46%

2.98%

3.35%

Pnbn

10.51%

9.05%

51.26%

5.45%

5.55%

Notes: the table reports summary statistics for ΔCoVaRi99t for 99 percent risk measure for all banks in the Indonesian’s Banking system.
ΔCoVaRi99 is obtained using M-GARCH estimation process to measure the contribution of distress from individual banking i to the banking
system.

means that if these two banks fail, then their
failure will contribute 30% to the failure of the
banking system in Indonesia. Also, the maximum value of ΔCoVaR from State-Owned En-
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terprises (SOE) banks, namely Bank Mandiri,
BNI Bank (BBNI), BRI Bank (BBRI) is more
than 60%. This finding implies that in the most
severe conditions, these state-owned banks
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework

Note: The figure shows the time series of monthly ΔCoVaR99,t from 2005 to 2018 for a sample of 21 commercial banks in Indonesia.

Table 3. Systemically Bank Ranking Based on ΔCoVaR Estimation
Bank

Size

BBRI
BMRI
BBCA
BBNI
BDMN
BNGA
PNBN
BNLI
BNII
BVIC
NISP
BCIC
INPC
BKSW
BRIAGRO
MNC
BSWD
MEGA
MAYA
BEKS
BBNP

Big
Big
Big
Big
Big
Big
Medium
Medium
Big
Small
Medium
Medium
Medium
Small
Small
Small
Small
Medium
Medium
Small
Small

Before Crisis
(2005-2007)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

During Crisis
(2007-2010)
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
12
13
10
11
15
14
16
19
18
20
17
21

After Crisis
(2010-2012)
2
1
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
12
13
7
11
15
14
16
18
17
20
19
21

Recovery
(2012-2018)
2
1
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11
12
7
13
15
14
16
18
17
20
19
21

Notes: The table the bank ranking for four periods from ΔCoVaR99,t estimation.

would have the most significant contribution to
the collapse of the banking system in Indonesia.
As a consequence, government regulations are
needed to monitor these banks to avoid highrisk activities that can increase the probability
of failure in the Indonesian banking system.
Figure 1 shows the value of ΔCoVaR for
all banks over time. Before the crisis period
(2005 - 2007), overall ΔCoVaR was less than
30% with the least number was 5% for bank
BBNP. During the crisis period, ΔCoVaR for all
banks reaches a peak with the highest value of

more than 60% for Bank Mandiri. From 2010
to 2013 was a stable period in which the overall
ΔCoVaR reached the lowest point at about less
than 30%.
We consider that the ranking of systemically
important banks based on ΔCoVaR will be different dynamically depend on the changing of
macroeconomic cycles. Table 3 explains the
systemic bank ranking based on ΔCoVaR for
the four periods before the crisis, during the crisis, after the crisis, and recovery. In general, the
top five rankings for the five big banks in In-
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Figure 2. Cross-section relation between financial institutions characteristics and contribution to
systemic risk

Note: The figure reports the cross-section plots of contribution to systemic risk (measured by average ΔCoVaR), and institution size (measured
by market capitalization), and Institution’s beta.

Figure 3. Conceptual Framework

Note: The figure reports time-series plot of average ΔCoVaR and VaR for all banks. ΔCoVaR series are plotted on the left axis and VaR series
on the right axis.

donesia, namely BBRI, BMRI, BBCA, BBNI,
and BDMN, are always the same, even though
in the period before the crisis BBRI was on
the first ranking while on the rest of the period
BMRI was consistently on to be the top ranking. Interestingly, there are two medium-sized
banks ranked in the top 10, namely PNBN and
BNLI.
Given the concept of “ too big to fail” and
various proposals about the regulatory scrutiny
that these banks should get, it should be on the
researchers’ interest of to investigate the relation between the size of banks and their contribution to systemic risk. The left side of igure 2 shows the link between the bank’s size
(measured by total market capitalization) and
the bank’s ΔCoVaR. The scatter plot displays
the weak relation between to measures, particularly for those big and medium-sized banks.
However, it seems on the right side of figure
2, the relation between beta and ΔCoVaR has a
somewhat negative correlation.
On the other hand, figure 3 reports a relation-
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ship between two measurements which are the
time series of average ΔCoVaR and VaR. Although there seems to be a stronger relationship
in time-series compared to the cross-section,
we need to identify the exact relationship using regression. To confirm the relation between
ΔCoVaR and bank’s characteristics, we employ
panel regression analysis. We regress ΔCoVaR
for each bank as the dependent variable and the
explanatory variables such as VaR, ln(size), institutions beta, time dummy before and after the
crisis, and external control variables namely the
United States Market Index (Standard and Poor
500) and SIBOR 1 month.
Table 4 shows the estimation results of
ΔCoVaR and the explanatory variables. The
effect of VaR on ΔCoVaR is positive and significant at 95% and the coefficient estimate is
0.311. The results confirm the dynamic plots in
figure 3 in which VaR banks have a positive impact on systemic risk. The effect of log(size) on
ΔCoVaR is negative and statistically significant
at 90% level. The weak relationship between
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Table 4. Determinants of Systemic Risk in the Indonesian’s Banking System
Dependent variable

ΔCoVaR
0.641*
(1.893)
0.311**
2.042
-0.003
(-0.375)
-0.040*
(-1.786)
0.011
(-0.782)
0.009
(1.289)
2.029***
(4.752)
0.174 ***
(2.313)

Constant
VaR
Beta
Size
D1
D2
SIBOR one month
S&P 500

Note: t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on the Newey-west standard errors to rectivy serial correlation and heteroscedasticity
problems. * Significance at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significance at the 1% level.

ΔCoVaR and size justify the result in table 3
and figure 2 that the size of banks does not have
a major role in determining the systemic risk.
Finally, we find the effect of each bank’beta
does not have an impact on systemic risk in Indonesia, suggesting that market sensitivity does
not affect contributing to systemic risk.
One interesting finding is that the effect of
external factors is positive and significant at
99% level. The US market index has a strong
impact on systemic risk in Indonesia with the
coefficient estimation is 2.029. The results suggest that the systemic risk in Indonesia strongly
depends on market conditions in the US. In line
with the previous result, the effect from SIBOR
1-month has a positive and significant with the
coefficient 0.174. Therefore, the external factors have a strong contribution to systemic risk
in Indonesia.
Overall, the findings from Table 4 are different from previous studies such as Acharya
et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016) that size and beta are not important in
explaining systemic risk contribution. We argue
that previous papers using developed countries
such as the United States where the institution
characteristics have a strong contribution to determine the systemic risk. Another reason, the
driver of systemic risk for the emerging market
can come from the developed countries since
they have the possibility to spillover to emerging countries when in severe conditions. Our

findings are consistent with the findings of an
earlier study conducted by (Buch, Krause, &
Tonzer, 2019) that argue the external factors
have a major role in contributing to a systemic
risk. The results are relevant for macroprudential policy discussions since they give informative results regarding to the degree of systemic
risk, the relevance of bank characteristics, and
argues that externalities are important for the
surveillance of systemic risk. If banks’ characteristics do not have a significant contribution
to systemic risk, the regulation should not overlook the contagion from externalities factors.
Under this condition, the regulator can tighten
the regulatory “international effect” rather than
the national effect.

Conclusion
The recent global financial crisis has raised
the public and regulators awareness of systemically important banks. Banks that are considered systemically important banks have the
potential to harm the financial system and the
economy as a whole. Bisias et al. (2012) conducted a systemic risk survey, and they found
that there are 31 systemic risk measurements. It
implies that there are various systemic risk definitions following these measurements. However, we consider that the various definitions refer
to one keyword as mentioned by Bandt (2000)
which defines systemic risk as a risk of finan127
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cial instability which is widespread and impairs
the functioning of the financial system to the
point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially.
The systemic risk can be defined into two
key elements, namely shocks and widespread
mechanism. The first key element is the shock
which can be idiosyncratic or systematic. Following the financial theory, idiosyncratic shock
initially affects only the health of one financial
institution. The systematic shock is the type of
shock which can affect the whole financial system or economy. For example, a stock market
crash can be a systematic shock on most financial institutions despite the different exposure
for each financial institution. The second key
element of systemic risk is the spillover mechanism from one institution to another institution
and the financial system. The spread of shock
in the financial system can be through environmental exposure or information effects (including potential losses).
From the spillover point of view, we investigate systemic risk in the Indonesian Financial
System using the modification of Conditional
Value at Risk (CoVaR) proposed by Girardi and
Ergun (2013) since the original CoVaR from
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) could not capture the dynamic effect when estimating for the
long horizon. We employ CoVaR estimation using the Multivariate GARCH model to capture

the dynamic relation over time and robust for
the long horizon. Finally, we define ΔCoVaR as
the systemic risk contribution of an institution
under financial distress.
Our systemic risk measurement, ΔCoVaR,
shows that the top five systemically essential
banks in Indonesia are dominated by stateowned banks, including Bank Mandiri, Bank
BRI, and Bank BNI. During the crisis period,
these banks had the highest contribution to the
systemic risk of more than 60% compared to
other banks. Furthermore, we find that the ranking of the top five banks with the most significant contribution to the systemic risk is relatively stable in the period before, during, after,
and the recovery period from the crisis.
We also examine the relationship between
bank characteristics and systemic risk contribution. We empirically find that individual bank
characteristics have a weak relation to systemic
risk. In contrast, we find that the external factors have a robust relation to systemic risk in
the Indonesian banking system. Finally, these
findings have important implications for regulators; the government should not overlook the
contagion effect from externalities factors. Under this condition, the regulator can tighten the
regulatory “international effect” rather than a
national effect to enhance the surveillance and
to maintain systemic risk in Indonesia.
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